The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates constrains the central bank's ability to stimulate the economy during downturns. We use the FRB US model to quantify the e ects of the bound on macroeconomic stabilization and to explore how policy can be designed to minimize these e ects. During particularly severe contractions, open-market operations alone may be insu cient to restore equilibrium; some other stimulus is needed. Abstracting from such rare events, if policy follows the Taylor rule and targets a zero in ation rate, there is a signi cant increase in the variability of output but not in ation. However, a simple modi cation to the Taylor rule yields a dramatic reduction in the detrimental e ects of the zero bound.
Introduction
Early in this decade, Lawrence Summers 1991 argued that, because nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero, monetary policy faces a trade-o between achieving zero average in ation and macroeconomic stability, given that the latter occasionally requires negative real interest rates to o set contractionary disturbances. 2 Until the past few years, this issue appeared moot in the United States and most other developed economies. However, with in ation lately falling to very low levels here and abroad, the proposition that policy could be constrained with interest rates stuck at zero for a prolonged period of time no longer seems far-fetched. Indeed, this possibility has become reality in Japan where, as shown in Figure 1 , the call money rate has been below 50 basis points for the last 2 years, accompanied by rising unemployment and the emergence of consumer price de ation. Because of these developments, there has been renewed interest in the implications of the zero bound for monetary policy. In this paper, we attempt to quantify the e ects of the zero bound on macroeconomic stability for di erent levels of average in ation, and to illuminate how these e ects can bediminished through the design of monetary policy.
While Japan's current troubles are instructive, it is as yet an isolated example and therefore provides few data on the likely e ect of the zero bound on macroeconomic 2 Summers also points to the existence of downward wage rigidity as a reason to target an in ation rate as high as 2 or 3 percent" p.627. Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen 1999 , making the additional point that persistent de ation can lead to liquidity and solvency problems that might exacerbate contractions, propose a target rate of in ation in the vicinity of 1 to 3 percent p.30. John Taylor argues that an in ation target of zero but not lower probably poses no serious stability problems; nevertheless, he proposes a 2 percent in ation target on the grounds that this rate is approximately consistent with zero percent true" in ation given the upward bias to measured in ation. Solow and Taylor 1998, pp. 33 34, 45 . However, recent and upcoming methodological improvements to the CPI and other price indices have probably reduced the bias in measured price in ation below the gure cited by T aylor|see Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches and Jorgensen 1996 and Council of Economic Advisors 1999, pgs. 93-94|and for the measure of in ation used in this study the PCE chain-weight price index, the bias is probably under 1 percent. Figure 1 Japanese Interest Rates, Inflation, and Unemployment Call money rate CPI inflation Unemployment rate performance in general. As for the experience of the 1930s or even the 1950s, the evolution of nancial markets over the past 50 years, as well as other structural changes, limit its relevance for modern economies. Therefore, the approach of most recent studies of this issue has been to use simulations of macroeconometric models to address the question of how macroeconomic stability might c hange when the nonnegativity constraint binds.
bances. Using a small-scale rational expectations model of the U.S. economy, in which output and in ation are characterized by a signi cant degree of inertia, they study how the impulse responses of the system to aggregate demand and supply shocks are altered by c hanges in the policymakers' target rate of in ation. In the examples they report, the depth and length of recessions worsen modestly as the average rate of in ation is reduced from 2 percent to zero. However, because their analysis is based on a few illustrative shocks, it cannot be easily used to gauge the overall e ect of the zero bound on the average variability of output and in ation as the policy target approaches zero.
Orphanides and Wieland 1998, using a model similar to that of Fuhrer and Madigan, employ stochastic simulations|based on random draws from the distribution of the residuals of the model's equations|to estimate the tradeo between average aggregate variability and the target rate of in ation. They nd that the zero bound has a larger e ect on output stabilization than on in ation variability; they also quantify the degree to which the frequency and duration of simulated recessions rises in low in ation environments. By their nature, such quantitative results depend on the model's properties, recommending a comparison with results from other models. In particular, the model used by Orphanides and Wieland has two noteworthy features that are both important to the analysis of zero bound e ects and which differ substantially from those of many other models. First, the equilibrium real funds rate of their model is estimated to be only 1 percent, well below the value embedded in the model used in our analysis as well as its historical average over the 1960 to 1998 period, 2-1 2 percent. Second, the asymptotic standard deviations of the output gap and in ation generated by their model under the Taylor rule ignoring the zero bound are 1.0 and 0.7 percent, respectively, gures that are much smaller than results obtained from most other statistical models Levin, Wieland and Williams 1999 and Rudebusch and Svensson 1999 . Wolman 1998 considers the role of in ation dynamics in the e ects of the zero bound, and nds that the zero bound has little relevance if it is the price level alone that is sticky," and not|as in the models used by F uhrer and Moore and Orphanides and Wieland|the rate of in ation. This irrelevance arises because, in models without signi cant in ation inertia, the monetary authority is able to engineer large short-run changes in the growth of prices, thereby allowing it to sharply reduce real interest rates even when nominal interest rates are already low. 4 On theoretical grounds, one might betempted to discount the possibility of sticky in ation and thus accept Wolman's nding that the zero bound is of little concern. However, such a step may not be prudent, given the ongoing debate over whether the high degree of persistence displayed by in ation historically is evidence of intrinsic inertia, irrespective of theoretical arguments. For examples of the two sides of this debate, see Fuhrer 1997 and Rotemberg and Woodford 1997. Wolman also investigates how the design of policy can be improved in light of the zero bound. He nds that, even in the case of sticky in ation, policies directed at stabilizing the price level around a deterministic trend|as opposed to damping uctuations of in ation around a desired rate|greatly diminish the e ects of the zero bound on the variability of output and in ation. As we shall see, price-level targeting represents a special case of a class of policy rules that have the property o f diminishing the detrimental e ects of the zero bound.
The research described above focuses on the limitations placed by the zero lower 4
Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that is similar to Wolman's, Rotemberg and Woodford 1997 also nd that the existence of the zero lower bound has only a small e ect on the optimal target rate of in ation. Because Rotemberg and Woodford linearize their model, they do not directly impose the non-linear zero bound constraint o n i n terest rates in their simulations. However, they are able to account for its e ect indirectly by placing a high penalty o n v ariability i n the interest rate in the policymaker's loss function.
bound on the e ectiveness of standard open-market operations. Krugman 1998, studying the current Japanese experience, considers various alternatives to standard open-market operations open to the Japanese government to mitigate its current di culties; in particular, he proposes ways in which the Bank of Japan might in uence expectations so as to restore its ability to alter real borrowing costs. In a similar vein, Lebow 1993 and Clouse, Henderson, Orphanides, Small and Tinsley 1999 discuss options that the Federal Reserve might pursue in lieu of open-market operations to stabilize the economy.
In this paper, we build and expand on this bodyof work in two ways. First, we use the FRB US model|a large-scale open-economy rational expectations model of the U.S. economy employed at the Federal Reserve Board as a tool for forecasting and policy analysis|to provide additional quantitative estimates of the e ect of the zero bound on macroeconomic stability. As discussed in Levin et al. 1999 , the basic dynamic properties of FRB US di er signi cantly from both sticky-price models of the type used by Wolman and the sticky-in ation FM and MSR models employed by Fuhrer and Madigan and Orphanides and Wieland, respectively. In particular, the persistence of in ation in FRB US lies between that of the Taylor model|which uses a staggered wage contract structure that implies little in ation persistence|and that of the FM and MSR models which share the same basic price speci cation. In addition, output persistence in FRB US lies between that of the MSR and FM models. As such, the FRB US model occupies a potentially informative middle position in the debate over the correct empirical characterization of the economy.
Our second contribution is an exploration of how the e ect of the zero bound varies under alternative monetary policies. In particular, we investigate how policy rules might be designed to increase macroeconomic stability i n a n e n vironment of zero in ation. In this investigation, we consider the e ects of various modi cations to the standard Taylor rule. We also review the macroeconomic performance of rules that have been found to be e cient in the absence of the zero bound, and how it changes as the non-negativity constraint begins to bind.
It is important to stress that our analysis considers only the e ects of the zero bound on nominal interest rates, and not other factors that may a ect macroeconomic stabilization in a zero in ation environment. Thus, for example, we do not address the implications of a possible downward rigidity in wages, an important issue discussed by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry 1996 , Card and Hyslop 1997 , Kahn 1997 , and Lebow, Saks and Wilson 1999 . Nor do we include in our analysis any bene ts from low in ation, such as those associated with a reduction in distortions related to interactions of in ation with the tax system see Feldstein 1997 . For these reasons, this paper addresses only one of the many issues involved in the determination of an optimal rate of in ation|a topic for which there is a large literature, beginning with Keynes 1923 , with more recent contributions from Fisher and Modigliani 1978 , Fisher 1981 , Dri ll, Mizon and Ulph 1990 , Orphanides and Solow 1990 , Sarel 1996 , and Clark 1997 , as well as the collection of papers contained in Feldstein, ed 1999 .
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following section we review the underlying mechanism of the zero bound problem. In particular we show, in the context of a simple stylized macromodel, how the non-negativity constraint can render conventional open-market operations ine ective and in certain circumstances give rise to de ationary spirals. From this general overview we turn to the speci cs of the approach used to quantify the costs of the zero bound, including a review of the principal features of the FRB US model as well as several methodological issues. Next we turn to our rst set of results, and consider how the steady-state distributions of output, in ation, and interest rates vary as policymakers|following the Taylor rule|change the target rate of in ation. From there we turn to a discussion of how monetary policy could bedesigned in light o f the zero bound, and demonstrate that simple modi cations of the Taylor rule can mitigate the costs associated with the zero bound in a low in ation environment. Finally, we conclude with a summary of our results.
The Mechanism of the Zero Bound Problem
Central to all the recent studies noted in the introduction is the idea that the zero lower bound may, under some circumstances, interfere with the ability of the monetary authority to stabilize the economy through adjustments to the level of real interest rates. To illustrate this concern, consider the following stylized model: y t = y t,1 + r t,1 , r + " t t = t,1 + y t,1 + t r t = i t , t i t = max 0; r + t + t , + y t : 1 In this system, y, the output gap|the percent di erence between real GDP and its trend level|depends on the lagged output gap, the lagged level of the real short-term rate of interest r relative to its equilibrium value r , and transitory shocks ". The in ation process is modeled using a backward-looking accelerationist Phillips curve that is also subject to transitory disturbances , while the real interest rate is equal to the di erence between the nominal short-term rate i and current in ation. To close the model, i is set using a generalized version of the Taylor rule, implying that Abstracting from the zero bound for the moment, in an economy described by such a model, random shocks to aggregate demand and prices, in conjunction with the coe cients of the system, yield stable probability distributions for all macroeconomic variables, including interest rates. This property implies that the normal conduct of monetary policy involves a predictable degree of variation in the level of the federal funds rate over time. This variation is illustrated by Figure 2 , which shows two hypothetical distributions for the short-term nominal interest rate, both of which are drawn ignoring the non-negativity constraint. The means of both distributions are equal to the equilibrium nominal funds rate denoted by i 1 and i by the central bank . In the examples shown, the two distributions di er only because policymakers target a lower average level of in ation in the case of the dashed curve.
Under the high in ation target the solid curve, essentially the entire range of nominal interest rate outcomes produced by the policy rule is to the right of zero; only in very rare instances|shown by the shaded region under the curve|would the non-negativity constraint prevent policymakers from responding to changes in output and in ation by the full amount dictated by the reaction function. By contrast, under a low in ation regime|or alternatively, in economies with a low equilibrium real interest rate|the zero bound would routinely impinge on normal monetary operations. As illustrated by the shaded region under the dashed curve, in this case a large portion of the mass of the unconstrained interest rate distribution lies to the left of zero, indicating that in practice nominal interest rates would be at or close to zero a large fraction of the time.
It is at such times that the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy through open-market operations is sharply diminished. If the nominal interest rate is at zero, it is no longer possible to reduce the real interest rate further to counteract de ationary pressures. In fact, under extreme conditions a self-perpetuating de ationary cycle can develop, in which a decrease in in ation endogenously raises the level of the real rate, causing demand to weaken and push in ation down more, thereby raising the real interest rate even further. With the monetary authority p o werless to stop this downward spiral through conventional open-market operations, the de ationary episode ends only if the economy experiences some other stimulus to spending.
The phase diagram for the simple model shown in Figure 3 helps illustrate this process. For this gure we h a ve assumed that equals 2 percent and that r equals 2-1 2 percent.
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The model has two states, in ation and output. In this model, the in ation rate increases decreases when the output gap is positive negative, and is unchanged when y = 0 , as indicated by the = 0 line. The change in the output gap depends on the level of the gap and the di erence between the real interest rate and its long-run equilibrium, r . For positive nominal interest rates, the y = 0 curve slopes downward and intercepts the y = 0 axis at . Once the zero bound constrains policy|as indicated by the dashed line|the y = 0 curve bends backwards, because in this region the policy rule is replaced by the condition r = ,. There are two steady states, both occurring at an output gap of zero. The rst, labeled E 1 , is locally stable with in ation equaling , and corresponds to the unique steady state in the absence of a lower bound. The second point, E 2 , is saddle-path stable, with steady-state in ation equaling the negative of the equilibrium real interest rate, and the nominal interest rate equaling zero.
It is useful to distinguish between three regions in the gure. First, in the area above the dashed line the zero bound is not a constraint on policy and has no e ect. In the region between the dashed line and the saddle path leading to the constrained steady state E 2 , the e ectiveness of monetary policy is diminished by the zero bound but the economy eventually returns to equilibrium on its own. However, if the economy nds itself in the third region|the shaded area to the southwest of the saddle path leading to E 2 |the system is unstable with output and in ation continuously falling. Such a region amounts to a de ationary trap for monetary policymakers, for in the absence of some positive external shock such as stimulative scal policy, conventional open market operations are unable to restore equilibrium.
In addition, = :6, = ,:35, and = :25|roughly the values obtained from least-squares estimation using annual data over the period 1960 to 1998. In addition, the parameters of the monetary policy rule are assumed to be identical to the Taylor rule = :5, = :5. This result|that standard open-market operations may be insu cient to restore equilibrium|holds for almost any macroeconomic model in which 1 monetary policymakers in uence aggregate spending primarily through actual and anticipated changes in real short-term interest rates, and 2 in ation displays signi cant inertia. Its implication for monetary policy is a cautionary one: If policymakers pursue a v ery low in ation target, they increase the risk that under extreme conditions they may not beable to stabilize the economy using conventional means.
Under such circumstances, stabilization may require action on the part of the scal authority, such as reductions in tax rates and increases in expenditures. However, even if one were con dent on theoretical grounds that any de ationary spiral could be eventually stopped through su ciently expansionary scal action, one might beless sanguine about the practical success of using scal policy to stabilize the economy. For example, at times it may be di cult to enact major changes in the budget, particularly in a timely manner; Japan's current experience is perhaps instructive in this regard. More generally, the legislative process is slow relative to central bank deliberations. As a result, in situations where the non-negativity constraints binds, it is unlikely that scal policy would ever be so e ective a substitute for monetary policy as to undo all the consequences of the zero bound for macroeconomic stability.
Alternatively, the central bank on its own could attempt to stimulate the economy using non-standard procedures, such as massive purchases of long-term securities or foreign exchange. However, the likely e ectiveness of such actions is unclear from a theoretical perspective, and they have never been put to a de nitive test. Thus, their ability t o substitute for conventional open-market operations is open to question.
The FRB US Model
In the absence of direct empirical evidence on macroeconomic performance in a low in ation environment, assessment of the threat posed by the zero bound must rely on simulations of macroeconomic models. For this study, we use FRB US, a largescale open-economy model of the United States, that is used at the Federal Reserve Board as a tool for forecasting and policy analysis. This model is well-suited for our purposes, because it satis es several criteria that, we believe, are needed by any model if it is to provide reliable quantitative estimates of the consequences of the non-negativity constraint|goodness of t, model-consistent expectations, and a well-speci ed description of the transmission mechanism. 6 
Goodness of t
To assess the actual threat posed by the zero bound, a model should provide a reasonably accurate empirical representation of the economy. The questions under consideration are at heart quantitative: How often does the zero constraint bind as the average rate of in ation is reduced? To what degree does the expected frequency, length, and depth of recessions change as the target rate of in ation falls? FRB US satis es this criterion because considerable care was taken in estimation to ensure that the model's simulated dynamics for GDP, in ation, interest rates, and other aggregate variables approximately match that of the data over the 1965 to 1997 period.
As discussed in Brayton and Tinsley 1996 and Brayton et al. 1997a , goodness To generate the autocorrelations, monetary policy was de ned using a formal rule estimated over the period 1980 to 1997, where the funds rate depends on the lagged funds rate, the output gap, and the average growth rate of PCE chain-weight prices over the past four quarters. to 1997, while the dotted lines show the one standard error bands for the data-based estimates. As seen in the top panel, the model's predictions for the autocorrelation of output closely track those found in the data. The t for in ation is not quite so impressive|the model generates somewhat less inertia in the in ation process|but the di erences between the predictions of FRB US and the data are generally small in both an economic and statistical sense.
Model-consistent expectations
Because analysis of the zero bound involves simulating conditions that are quite dissimilar to those experienced during the past 40 years the period over which most macromodels are estimated, results generated using models with implicit adaptive expectations could be misleading. For example, such models are unlikely to take adequate account of a radical change in the nature of monetary policy that occurs when the non-negativity constraint binds. This change, which implies accompanying alterations to the nature of expectations, is probably better accounted for in models that employ explicit rational expectations|that is, models in which the public's beliefs about the future path of a given variable are equal to that predicted by the model itself, under the assumption that there are no future shocks to the economy. Alternatively put, the use of model-consistent expectations makes our results less susceptable to the Lucas critique. Such rational expectations are also better suited to assessing the likely success of policy strategies that hinge on in uencing the public's expectations, such as those proposed by Krugman 1998. Thus, for this paper all the expectational variables of FRB US are assumed to be model-consistent. An important corollary of this assumption is that policy is perfectly credible. In particular, in all our model simulations there is no doubt on the part of the public about the monetary authority's objectives and procedures: The public is fully aware that policymakers follow a speci ed policy rule without fail, except when prevented from doing so by the zero bound.
The monetary transmission mechanism
In analyzing the e ects of the zero bound, models that use a simple version of the transmission mechanism may bedisadvantaged relative to ones that provide a more detailed treatment of the channels through which policy in uences the real economy. To see this, consider a model employing a reduced-form characterization of the link between output or in ation and the real interest rate, estimated using current and lagged information on the federal funds rate and in ation. In such a model, there is no role for anticipated policy responses beyond that captured by average historical correlations with past actions. However, in a more fully articulated model that includes a bond market, such expectational e ects do matter and interact in important w ays with the zero bound. In particular, such expectational channels|which in yet more complicated models include e ects operating through a variety of nancial markets, including corporate equity, foreign exchange, and bonds of various maturities and risk|provide a means for the monetary authority to in uence aggregate resource utilization today e v en if the funds rate is currently trapped at zero, by adopting policies that alter the public's beliefs about the future.
FRB US has a relatively detailed description of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. To begin, policymakers are assumed to respond systematically to current macroeconomic conditions, speci cally by using a formal rule to determine the federal funds rate. Investors, based on their expectations for the future path of the funds rate, set bond prices to continuously equalize risk-adjusted expected rates of returns on government and private securities of di erent maturities; similar arbitrage relationships determine equity prices and the foreign exchange value of the dollar. These various asset prices, in turn, in uence the spending of utility-maximizing consumers and pro t-maximizing rms; they respond gradually to changes in real long-term interest rates and other nancial variables, as well as to movements in their expectations for future income, sales, and in ation. Finally, current in ation responds both to past and expected future changes in prices and to current and expected resource utilization, in a manner similar in spirit to that introduced by Buiter and Jewitt 1981 and empirically implemented by F uhrer and Moore 1995. As already discussed, the result is considerable inertia on the part of the in ation rate in the model.
The FRB US characterization of the transmission mechanism is in accord with the conventional" view that monetary policy primarily in uences real activity indirectly, through changes in the funds rate that alter bond rates and other asset prices; less emphasis is placed on the credit channels" view of Bernanke and Gertler 1995 and others. However, the model does include two speci c channels for credittype e ects to in uence aggregate demand|a cash-ow variable in the equation for investment in producers' durable equipment, and an assumption that a portion of consumer spending is accounted for by liquidity-constrained households estimated at 10 percent. Moreover, as noted by Romer and Romer 1990 , a substantial portion of the movements in loan volumes and non-rate credit terms are correlated with changes in interest rates, money, and output, suggesting that some of these channels are probably captured by FRB US despite its focus on asset prices.
The role of money is another area where the FRB US model di ers from some macromodels. In FRB US there is no mechanism for a change in the money supply to in uence the economy|other than through its role in standard open-market operations 9 |in contrast with models that postulate a role for money in the macroeconomy via real-balance e ects, cash-in-advance constraints, or the inclusion of money holdings in consumers' utility functions. Nor does the model allow for changes in the 9 Any c hange in the federal funds rate is associated with a corresponding change to the reserves of the banking system, and thus the monetary base. The correspondence between changes in money and changes in the funds rate is determined by the joint i n teraction of the money demand equation and the reserves multiplier.
relative supply of nancial assets to a ect prices, thereby ruling out the possibility that the central bank could reduce the spread between long and short-term interest rates through massive purchases of bonds: Although term and risk premiums in FRB US are endogenous, they respond only to changes in current and expected resource utilization. In principle, these various channels may o er policymakers levers to in uence aggregate demand even when short-term interest rates fall to zero, and by using a model that ignores them, we may overstate the threat posed by the zero bound. However, the e ectiveness of such levers is untested.
For example, the view is often expressed that, even with interest rates stuck at zero, a central bank could always pull the economy out of a de ationary episode through helicopter drops" of money, which would increase spending through the real-balance e ect. If such drops are not accompanied by corresponding acquisitions of bonds|the opposite of conventional open-market operations in which changes in central bank liabilities are matched by changes in assets|then there is the practical problem of how the funds would be distributed to households and rms absence an accompanying increase in government outlays. As discussed by Clouse et al. 1999 , the Federal Reserve does not have legal authorization to simply give money to individuals and corporations, although there may be alternative methods that are legal and have the same practical e ect. However, these methods are clearly outside the realm of the historical practices of the Federal Reserve.
Methodology
To evaluate the likely e ect of the zero bound on macroeconomic performance, we perform stochastic simulations of the FRB US model to generate arti cial time series for the output gap, in ation, interest rates, and so forth. From this data we compute distributional statistics that allow us to analyze how the distributions of these variables are a ected by changes in the target rate of in ation and other aspects of monetary policy. To obtain reliable estimates of the e ect of the zero bound on the distribution of simulated macroeconomic outcomes|particularly as regards the lower tail, which has an especially important in uence on the frequency, depth, and duration of recessions|we generate several sets of very long time series of simulated data 12000 quarters per set. Details on the algorithm used to generate the stochastic simulations are presented in the appendix.
Stochastic disturbances
In running stochastic simulations, we assume that disturbances to the approximately 50 estimated equations of the model|including various components of aggregate spending, labor force participation, productivity, w ages and prices, bond and equity premiums, and foreign economic conditions|are distributed normally N0; .
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The variance-covariance matrix is estimated from equation residuals for the period 1966 to 1995. Because this period includes the relatively volatile 1970s, the average magnitude of the disturbances is signi cantly larger than would be obtained if the sample only included the 1980s and 1990s, as in Orphanides and Wieland 1998 . Speci c values for the disturbances are obtained from random draws from this distribution. These residuals generally appear to be white noise, but in a few cases notably bonds and equity prices, they display signi cant autocorrelation. In such 10 In the stochastic simulations there are no shocks to the monetary policy rule, such as might inadvertently occur in practice because of real-time mismeasurement of the output gap or in ation; however, the policy rule is subject to implicit shocks" whenever the non-negativity constraint binds. On the scal side, the simulations do incorporate transitory disturbances to e ective tax rates and government spending. The simulations also take into account transitory disturbances to important exogenous" variables such as imported oil prices, because FRB US includes simple stochastic equations for these variables.
cases, this serial correlation is incorporated into the model.
There are two important implications of the assumption that the stochastic disturbances are normally distributed. First, in a large sample some of the shocks will be drawn from well out in the tails of the distribution. In fact, our stochastic simulation exercises include some rare episodes driven by sequences of disturbances whose overall magnitude are greater than that actually experienced during any recession of the past 30 years. Second, in the context of a linear model, normally distributed shocks imply that the distributions of all simulated variables will besymmetric in large samples. However, because the non-negativity constraint introduces an important nonlinearity into the system, the distributions of output, in ation, interest rates, and other variables display asymmetries around their means when the zero bound is an active constraint o n policy.
Bias adjustments to the policy rule
Using stochastic simulations of a model in which policy is described by linear Taylor-style policy rules, Orphanides and Wieland 1998 nd that, on average, ination is below its target and output is below potential in situations where the nonnegativity constraint frequently binds. This result arises because policy deviates from the prescriptions of the unconstrained rule whenever the zero bound is hit, implying that at such times the rule is, in e ect, subjected to a positive shock". In the absence of o setting negative deviations from the rule at times when interest rates are unconstrained, nominal interest rates therefore will on average be higher than would beprescribed by the unconstrained policy rule.
To reduce the e ects of this phenomenon, in our simulations we incorporate a notional upward adjustment to the in ation target of the policy rule to o set the average e ect of the positive deviations to the rule that occur when interest rates fall to zero. In this way, policy attains its in ation goal on average.
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As shown in the next section, this bias adjustment is a non-linear function of the target rate of in ation, among other factors. We use this form of adjustment because of its simplicity and transparency, not because it is optimal. Intuitively, a better strategy would be to employ a conditional adjustment t o t h e policy rule that adjusts the funds rate down immediately before or after episodes of zero interest rates; in this way o setting movements in the funds rate would bemore likely to occur when economic activity is still weak and in ation low. We consider just such a strategy in Section 6 of the paper.
Fiscal policy
In the model simulations, we assume that scal policy generally acts according to estimated equations that capture the average behavior of the main tax and expenditure categories seen in post-war business cycles. However, the stochastic simulations occasionally yield severe de ationary episodes that are historically unusual. During these periods, with the nominal funds rate stuck at zero, the economy could become trapped in a de ationary spiral.
To avoid this type of catastrophic collapse in simulation, we make allowance in the formation of expectations for the possibility of emergency scal stimulus in cases of extremely persistent periods of zero rates. Speci cally, it is assumed that rms and households anticipate that a scal stimulus rescue package" will eventually be enacted if the funds rate is projected to beat or near zero for seven years into the 11 In a backward-looking model, this adjustment w ould entirely eliminate the e ects of the bias. In forward-looking models, however, both realized and anticipated episodes of a binding non-negativity constraint a ect the economy, implying that a simple bias adjustment will not eliminate all e ects of the bias. This problem is further complicated by the fact that our simulation algorithm imposes certainty equivalence|that is, all future shocks are assumed to be zero|which i n troduces additional biases to the means of all variables.
future.
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The stimulus is assumed to be of su cient magnitude to exactly o set the e ect of the zero bound until the economy recovers. The exact speci cation of this rescue package is not crucial to the results presented in this paper; its impact is only felt in very severe contractions. Overall, its e ect is to constrain the worst-case recession to output declines of about 20 percent below potential. In the simulations reported below, the rescue package is invoked only rarely|about once a millennium ! on average for an in ation target of 2 percent, and once a century for a zero target.
Equilibrium real interest rate
A nal issue concerns the calibration of the equilibrium real funds rate, the rate consistent with a normal long-run average level of resource utilization. Whether this rate is high or low has a great in uence on our quantitative results, because the sum of this variable and the target rate of in ation determines the maximum stimulus policymakers can provide on average to counteract contractionary shocks. As noted earlier, if this policy bu er is large, the zero bound is likely to beof little practical relevance; if small, the non-negativity constraint binds a signi cant percentage of the time. Furthermore, given the one-for-one tradeo between the real equilibrium rate and target in ation inherent in the de nition of i , the higher the estimated value of r , the more target in ation can bereduced and still bejudged consistent with a given level of macroeconomic variability.
To compute historical estimates of the real funds rate actual and equilibrium, we use as our measure of in ation the growth rate of the chain-weight price index for personal consumption expenditures. With this measure, we nd that 2 1 2 percent i s a reasonable value for the long-run equilibrium real funds rate, based on: the average 12 A delay o f s e v en years may seem unduly slow, but our goal is to gauge the full consequences of the zero bound for the e ectiveness of monetary policy; therefore, we use scal policy as a substitute for open-market operations only as absolutely necessary in extreme circumstances.
value of the real funds rate over the 1960-1998 period 2.55 percent; estimates derived from simple dynamic IS curves e.g., regression of the output gap on a constant and lags of the gap and the real funds rate; and a more thorough study of the issue by Bom m 1998 that uses the entire FRB US model. It is straightforward to determine how the results reported in the next section would be a ected by adopting an alternative estimate of r . For example, the outcomes for a 0 percent in ation target and a 3 1 2 percent equilibrium real rate would be the same as those we report for a 1 percent in ation target. denotes the four-quarter percent change in the level of chain-weight PCE prices. To see how expected macroeconomic conditions are altered as the zero bound becomes more of a factor, we run a series of simulations in which , the target rate of in ation used in the rule, is progressively lowered. Given the one-for-one correspondence between changes in and i |recall that r is assumed to be constant a t 13 Throughout our analysis, we assume that the long-run value of the equilibrium real rate is constant although the value of the real funds rate consistent with a zero output gap in the short to medium run varies considerably in the simulations. However, there is reason to suspect that r may shift gradually over time, owing to low-frequency movements in supply and demand factors. For example, Bom m 1998 nds that the equilibrium real funds rate may h a ve been as high as 4 percent during the 1980s, when the stance of scal policy was quite expansionary. Output gap 3.6 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.9 In ation 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 Federal funds rate 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5
Notes:
1. Percent of quarters funds rate 5 basis points. 2. Mean number of consecutive quarters funds rate 5 basis points.
2-1 2 percent|these simulations allow us to analyze the link between in ation objectives and the distributions of simulated outcomes for the funds rate, in ation, and output. Because the disturbances used in the stochastic simulations are, for the most part, similar in magnitude to those experienced over the past four decades, this distributional information can be used to estimate the expected cost in macroeconomic stability if any that is likely to be incurred in low in ation environments. The top portion of Table 1 shows the quarterly frequency and average duration of episodes where the federal funds rate falls to zero in the simulations. For an in ation target of 4 percent, the zero bound is reached less than 1 percent of the time and the average duration of a spell of zero interest rates is about 2 quarters, suggesting that policy would nd itself constrained about once every 100 years on average. As the in ation target falls, the policy bu er shrinks and the frequency of hitting the constraint rises, as does the mean duration of periods spent stuck at the constraint. Moreover, the relationship between the in ation target and the frequency of hitting the zero bound is nonlinear: The frequency and duration of time spent constrained at the lower bound is little a ected by changes in the target in the region above 2 percent, but as it falls below 2 percent, such episodes become increasingly more common and prolonged. In the case of a zero percent in ation target, the funds rate is bounded at zero 14 percent of the time, and the mean duration of a spell of zero interest rates is one and a half years. Figure 5 shows the model-generated distribution of the funds rate for in ation targets of 0, 2, and 4 percent. The height of each bar shows the percentage of time that the funds rate lies in the speci ed range. With a 4 percent in ation target, the distribution of the funds rate is symmetric about its mean in this case, 6 1 2 percent|a not unexpected result, given the assumption of symmetrically distributed disturbances and a model that is linear outside the vicinity of the zero bound. The median of the distribution shifts to the left as the in ation target falls, and the impact of the zero bound is seen in the altered shape of the funds rate distribution, an e ect that is the result of two factors. First, in times when the policy rule prescribes negative rates, the actual funds rate is zero because of the bound; this shows up in the gure as an increase in the frequency of rates that fall between 0 and 1 2 percentage points. In e ect, the mass in the tail of the distribution that ordinarily would appear to the left of zero piles up at the lower bound. Second, as illustrated below, the existence of the zero bound in uences the distributions of output and in ation, and thereby the distribution of interest rates. Figure 6 shows the distribution of in ation for the same three in ation targets. Under a zero percent in ation target, in ation rates frequently lie well below zero in the simulations; the duration of such de ationary episodes is on average 1 or 2 years. The combination of a very low in ation target and the zero bound suggests that the economy would regularly experience relatively lengthy bouts of falling prices. For example, with a zero percent in ation target, the four-quarter de ation rate exceeds 1 about 10 pecent of the time. Another feature of these distributions is a loss of symmetry that accompanies a very low in ation target. In the case of a 2 or 4 percent in ation target, in ation outcomes are evenly distributed about the target rate. However, this is no longer true under a zero in ation target, in which case the distribution is skewed to the left. Nevertheless, the standard deviation of in ation shown in Table 1 is virtually invariant to the in ation target: The zero bound does not involve a signi cant tradeo between the level and variance of in ation.
Recall that we introduced a bias adjustment to the policy rule to o set the onesided nature of the zero bound. The magnitude of the bias adjustment|which can be thought of as a notional shift in the target rate of in ation that is used operationally to achieve the true desired rate of in ation on average|depends on the frequency and magnitude of deviations from the policy rule caused by the zero bound. As shown in table 1, for in ation targets of 2 percent and above the adjustment is tiny. As the target approaches zero, however, the zero bound becomes more of a problem and and the adjustment rises in magnitude. In e ect, policymakers who set the funds rate using the Taylor rule should e ectively behave as if they are targeting a 1-1 4 percent in ation rate if their objective is really to have in ation be1 percent on average; if their goal is a 0 percent average rate of in ation, they should set the notional target in the rule to about 3 4 percent.
The e ect of the zero bound on the distribution of the output gap is shown in Figure 7 . Because outcomes under a 4 percent in ation target appear so similar to those obtained with a 2 percent target, we show only the distributions for targets of 0 and 2 percent. The two distributions are overlaid to facilitate the comparison of the outcomes. The most noticeable e ect of the zero bound on the distribution of output is a decline in the frequency of mild recessions, and a corresponding increase in the likelihood of severe contractions. The overall e ect of the zero bound on output variability is seen in the rise of the standard deviation of the output gap|particularly under a zero in ation target|as reported in Table 1 .
Because of the limited manuevering room available to policymakers with an ination target of zero, such an objective signi cantly diminishes the e ectiveness of monetary policy in reducing the depth and duration of contractions. For example, following the approach of Orphanides and Wieland 1998, we de ne a period of low activity" to occur when the two-quarter moving average of the output gap falls below -6 percent. Such a gap constitutes a relatively deep recession by post-war standards, but our results would not be greatly changed if we w ere to use a smaller cut-o value. The frequency and duration of periods of low activity is essentially constant for cases where the in ation target is 2 percent or more, with the economy in a low activity state about 2 percent of the time; the average duration of these episodes is under a year. As the in ation target is reduced to zero, the frequency of low activity rises to about 5 percent, and the average duration of such periods rises to about one and half years.
Overall, these results suggest that macroeconomic stability would likely deteriorate somewhat if the target rate of in ation were to fall below 1 or 2 percent, assuming that policymakers follow the Taylor rule and the equilibrium real rate of interest is around 2-1 2 percent. Under these conditions, the zero bound gives rise to a tradeo between the average rate of in ation and the variability o f output; however, there is no signi cant tradeo between the average rate of in ation and in ation variability, at least for the range of in ation targets considered here.
The Design of Monetary Policy in Light of the Zero Bound
The results reported in the previous section were derived under the assumption that policymakers follow the Taylor rule in setting the funds rate. In this section we investigate how the e ects of the zero bound are altered by changing the nature of the policy rule in place. We begin with an alternative to the Taylor rule that is more responsive t o c hanges in macroeconomic conditions but retains the Taylor rule's basic speci cation. We then investigate the performance delivered by rules that represent more substantial modi cations to Taylor-style presciptions for setting the funds rate.
Performance under the Henderson-McKibbin rule
Consider a policy rule of the same form as the Taylor rule but with larger coefcients on the deviations of output and in ation from their respective target levels, such as the one advocated by Henderson and McKibbin 1993: i t = r + 4 t + 1 4 t , + 2 y t : 3 Research with the FRB US model, as well as with other macroeconometric models, has shown that such a policy rule does a better job at stabilizing in ation and real output, but leads to greater uctuations in the funds rate Levin et al. 1999 . The fact that the Henderson-McKibbin rule prescribes, on average, larger movements in the funds rate suggests that it is likely to violate the zero bound|in the sense of calling for negative interest rates|more frequently and by larger magnitudes.
The results from the Henderson-McKibbin rule mirror those of the Taylor rule. As shown in Table 2 , the variability o f real output and in ation is nearly una ected by changes in the in ation target in the region of 2 percent and above. However, the volatility of output rises signi cantly as the in ation target is reduced to zero. Nevertheless, the Henderson-McKibbin rule outperforms the Taylor rule in output and in ation stabilization, even with a low in ation target: Although the rule hits the zero bound more frequently by a s m uch as one third of the time with an in ation target of zero, it does such a better job of damping uctuations in output and in ation that it manages to avoid entering into potentially destabilizing de ationary situations into the rst place. Thus, the zero bound does not necessarily diminish the bene ts of more aggressive rules.
Augmenting the Taylor rule
In our analysis of both the Taylor and Henderson-McKibbin rules, the upward bias to interest rates directly resulting from the zero bound was o set by i n troducing a constant d o wnward bias term to the reaction function. This modi cation, however, does not directly address the issue of reducing the stabilization costs associated with the zero bound. Intuitively, a preferable modi cation to a linear policy rule would be one where the funds rate is lowered relative to the original rule when the economy i s o r is anticipated to be weak|that is, before entering, and after pulling out of, a period of zero short-term interest rates. Because of expectational e ects in the pricing of bonds and other long-term assets, such a modi cation should prove to be stimulative during constrained periods even if the departure from the rule occurs considerably later when the economic recovery is in full swing: Con dence that policy will be easier in the future than would normally be the case could lower bond rates today and raise current expectations of future in ation. For example, following a period in which the funds rate is constrained at zero, policymakers might continue to hold the rate at zero beyond the point at which the Taylor rule would normally prescribe a positive rate. In this way policy would make u p for lost opportunities to lower rates when the non-negativity constraint binds. Such Figure  8 . Consider a scenario where the Taylor rule|ignoring the zero bound|prescibes a path for the funds rate that falls from an initial level of 2 percent, reaching -2 percent before rising back to 2 percent after 5 years. As indicated by the thick solid line, one possible policy is to set the funds rate according to the Taylor rule until the zero bound is reached; thereafter short-term rates remain at zero until the unconstrained path for the funds rate raises above zero, at which point the funds rate rises in tandem with the Taylor rule. Alternatively, as indicated by the dashed line, policymakers might c hoose to hold down rates relative to the Taylor rule during the recovery period quarters 13 through 19. As shown in the upper right panel, this strategy keeps bond rates lower than they otherwise would beduring and immediately after the period of zero short-term interest rates, thereby mitigating the fall in output and in ation.
14 Policymakers also might c hoose to lower rates pre-emptively if they anticipate that the non-negativity constraint will bind in the near future. This strategy is illustrated by the dashed line of the bottom left panel of Figure 8 . In this case, short-term interest rates fall earlier than they do under the Taylor rule; the funds rate is also slower to rise above zero. As a result, bond yields fall to zero a year before they do under the Taylor rule, and stay lower for the next three years bottom right panel.
To evaluate the quantitative e ect of such changes to monetary policy in the vicinity of the zero bound, consider the following modi cation to the Taylor rule. Taylor   t denote the deviation at time t of the actual funds rate from the prescription of the standard unconstrained Taylor rule, and let Z t equal the cumulative sum of all past deviations. When the zero bound constrains policy, d t will be positive and Z t will be rising. What we seek is a policy that deviates from the Taylor rule in a negative direction at times when interest rates are unconstrained and there is a backlog" of past deviations|i.e., immediately following episodes of zero interest rates, when Z t is positive. One policy that does this is given by i t = maxfi Taylor that of the standard Taylor rule. An advantage of this speci cation is that the upward bias to interest rates arising from the zero bound is o set by automatic downward adjustment at other times. Table 3 reports the standard deviations of in ation and the output gap using the augmented Taylor rule for values of of -1 through 2 percent. Under the modi ed rule, even when the target rate of in ation is below zero, the zero bound has only a negligible e ect on in ation and output stabilization, assuming, as before, that scal policy steps in to guarantee an eventual return to macroeconomic equilibrium during especially severe contractions. A similar experiment w as conducted using the Henderson-McKibbin rule discussed above with the same result: The e ects of the zero bound were nearly completely negated by introducing adjustment to the past stock of deviations from the rule. Output gap 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 In ation 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 Federal funds rate 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.4
Let d t = i t , i
Why does this modi cation work so well at neutralizing the e ects of the zero bound? As suggested by Figure 8 , the answer is in its implications for the behavior of bond yields, which in FRB US play a central role in determining aggregate spending. Because most contractions are of shorter duration than the typical bond, the e ect of the zero bound on long-term interest rates is minimal: If the non-negativity constraint causes the funds rate to be high" for a year or two, under the augmented rule investors expect a subsequent period of low" rates, implying that the associated increase in yields on 5-year bonds is small on net; for longer-term securities, the e ect on yields is miniscule. Presumably, the e ect on bonds of short maturity would be strengthened further if policymakers also responded to anticipated as well as past periods of zero funds rate, along the lines discussed above.
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This mechanism explains why this modi cation is so e ective in FRB US and suggests that its e ectiveness may depend on the duration of bonds relevant to spending and the degree of inertia in in ation and output.
There are certain similarities between this modi cation of the Taylor rule and the proposals made by Krugman 1998 to mitigate Japan's current macroeconomic problems|in particular, his suggestion that the Bank of Japan should publicly pledge to target a relatively high rate of in ation over the medium term speci cally, 4 percent for the next 15 years. Like the augmented Taylor rule, such a policy entails a promise to keep the stance of monetary policy easier than it would otherwise be for a substantial period of time, in order to in uence the public's assessment of the level of real long-term interest rates today. Of course, the e ectiveness of either type of policy hinges on the credibility of policymakers. In the simulations reported in this paper, such e ectiveness is enhanced by our assumption that policymakers enjoy perfect credibility. However, we should stress that this credibility is realistic, because 15 Given the negligable e ects of the zero bound when the Taylor rule is augmented to respond to only past episodes of zero rates, we h a ve not bothered to evaluate the performance of rules that respond to anticipated episodes as well. the public's beliefs are fully consistent with what the monetary authority can actually deliver, taking account of the non-negativity constraint.
Policy frontiers and the zero bound
The preceding discussion highlighted the usefulness of augmenting the Taylor rule to respond to episodes of zero interest rates, either in the recent past or expected in the near future. One drawback to focusing on the Taylor rule is that, in the context of the FRB US model, it is known to be ine cient in terms of stabilizing the variances of in ation and output subject to constraints on interest rate volatility. We n o w turn our attention to the e ect of the zero bound on the types of simple policy rules that were found to be e cient in research that ignored the non-negativity constraint on nominal rates.
As shown by Williams 1999, in denotes the twelve-quarter percent change in the PCE price level expressed at an annual rate. This type of e cient rule di ers from the Taylor rule by responding to a smoother in ation measure and by responding to the cumulative deviations of output and in ation from their respective target levels. Such rules are frequently referred to as rst-di erence" or change" rules, because|absent the zero bound|they can beequivalently written in the form i t = i t,1 + it is important t o focus on the form given by equation 5. Figure 9 shows three frontiers for FRB US using simple policy rules optimized to minimize the weighted average of the variances of in ation and output subject to the constraint the standard deviation of the funds rate does not exceed 3-1 2 percentage points. The solid line shows the performance of the frontier rules where the target rate of in ation is -1 percent, the dotted line for a target of 0 percent, and the dot-dashed line for a target of 2 percent. Frontiers for in ation targets above 2 percent are indistinguishable from that shown by the dot-dashed line. As seen in the gure, a reduction in the in ation target results in a small increase in the variability o f in ation and output, with the marginal stabilization cost rising as the in ation target approaches and falls below zero. Also shown in the gure are the outcomes from the Taylor and Henderson-Mckibbin rules, adjusted to compensate for the average upward bias to interest rates, but not modi ed to incorporate an explicit response to past or anticipated deviations from the rule.
One striking result of Figure 9 is that, in relation to the Taylor or HendersonMcKibbin rules, the cost of reducing the in ation target is small for e cient policies. The e ectiveness of e cient rules at stabilizing the economy e v en with low or negative average rates of in ation can betraced to two factors. First, the average magnitude of uctuations is lower under e cient rules, so that the economy nds itself less frequently in a state of distress. Second, because the rules respond implicitly to all past output and in ation gaps, the current and expected future setting of policy incorporates the e ects of past constraints on policy from the zero bound. Hence, as in the case of the Taylor rule modi ed to respond to past policy constraints, e cient rules of the form characterized by equation 5 are associated with small losses in stabilization from the zero bound. This result is related to Wolman's 1998 nding that rules that target the price level, as opposed to the in ation rate, can overcome the e ects of the zero bound: Price-level targeting rules are a special case of equation In general, rules that implicitly or explicitly build in an o set to past deviations from the rule mitigate the e ects of the zero bound.
Conclusion
We draw three broad conclusions from previous research and our investigation. First, during particularly severe contractions, standard open-market operations alone may be insu cient to restore macroeconomic equilibrium; scal policy or some other stimulus may beneeded. However, our results suggest that such episodes are fairly rare, even in a low in ation environment|about once every 100 years if the target rate of in ation is around zero, given the sorts of shocks that have characterized the U.S. economy over the past 30 years.
Second, in very low in ation environments where policy follows the Taylor rule, the zero bound could prove to be a signi cant constraint on policy. For example, our simulations indicate that under such conditions the nominal funds rate could be stuck at zero over 10 percent of the time. With the e ectiveness of open-market operations diminished at times, the economy w ould likely experience a noticeable increase in the variability of output and employment, particularly if policymakers were to pursue an in ation target of 1 percent or below. However, our results do not suggest that the variability of in ation is greatly a ected by the zero bound, even with an in ation target of zero percent.
Finally, we nd that, in a world where policymakers enjoy perfect credibility augmenting the Taylor rule to incorporate a response to past constraints on policy dramatically reduces the detrimental e ects of the zero bound. Interestingly, policy rules that are e cient in the absence of the zero bound|that is to say, rules that provide the best possible set of tradeo s between output and in ation variability in moderate in ation environments|implicitly incorporate such behavior; hence, for such rules, the zero bound generates only relatively small stabilization costs. Although not formally analyzed here, incorporating a response to anticipated future constraints on policy would likely yield a further reduction in the detremental e ects of the zero bound on macroeconomic stabilization.
APPENDIX
Stochastic simulations of non-linear models under model-consistent expectations are computationally burdensome, especially on the scale conducted for this study. To make the problem computationally feasible, the FRB US model is log-linearized around sample means, an approximation that, abstracting from the e ects of the zero bound, has little e ect on the relevant dynamic properties of FRB US. Setting aside for the moment the issue of the imposition of the non-negativity constraint o n i n terest rates, the linearized model can bewritten E t M X j=,1 H j x t+j = Ge t ; 6 where M is the maximum lead in the model, x t is the vector of endogenous variables, and e t is a mean-zero vector of serially uncorrelated random disturbances with nite second moments, Eee 0 = . The information set for expectations formation differs across sectors; in general, date t expectations in the nancial sector incorporate knowledge of date t variables, x t , but expectations in the other sectors are limited to date t , 1 variables, x t,1 . F or a given speci cation of the policy rule, we solve for the saddle point rational expectations solution, if it exists, using the AIM algorithm developed by Anderson and Moore 1985 . The reduced form representation of the solution is given by x t = Ax t,1 + Be t ; 7 from this expression generation of simulated data for randomly-selected values of e t is straightforward.
To impose the non-negativity constraint on the model, the linear solution procedure is augmented to include additive disturbances to the levels of the funds rate for the current period and N future periods. These disturbances are set equal to zero if the unconstrained rule prescribes a funds rate setting greater than zero, and set equal to the absolute value of the unconstrained funds rate setting if the rule dictates a negative i n terest rate. Note that the zero bound holds in expectation only for a nite number of periods; as described below, we justify this speci cation on the grounds that scal policy can be expected to step in eventually and forestall a de ationary spiral. The results are not sensitive to the precise value of N. At each point in time, agents' expectations for future values of the policy disturbances are fully consistent with the model's predictions for future economic conditions, subject to the assumption that all future shocks to the economy excluding the additive disturbances to the policy rule just described are zero.
